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Few years ago, authentication of visual media has regarded as a crucial research area 
which concerns with the development of methods and tools to determine if the digital 
media has been forged or not. The detection of video tampering was a concern of 
many researchers because of its important role in road accident, court events, and 
other applications. In this manuscript, a new low cost video forgery detection 
algorithm has been proposed by utilizing the correlation coefficients between the 
video frames and embedding them as an encrypted data into the first frame of the 
video stream. Experimental results show the high performance of the proposed 
algorithm regarding visual quality and robustness due to the ability to detect tampering 
even in simple and low-effect attacks. 
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1. Introduction 
Nowadays, video tampering becomes a serious problem due to the easy synthesis of 
fake photographic images to promote a story through media channels and social media. 
This is due to great development in computer graphics and animation applications, and 
the availability of many digital image processing and manipulation tools with low cost. 
With the lake of suitable regulatory frameworks and the appropriate infrastructure to 
prosecute such sophisticated cybercrime, there is a growing discontent with the 
increasing use of these low enforcement tools. Therefore, there is a need to authentic 
video files [1-3]. 
Any video application can contain three parts: A creator, a recipient, and a third 
party. The creator produces the video, and the recipient receives the video from the 
creator through the third party. The third could be a storage device (e.g., CD/DVD) or 
it could be a noisy channel in a video stream. In addition, if the recipient sends the video 
to another party after receiving it, the recipient can also be a third party. Malicious 
attackers point to such third parties to change the content of video. Video authentication 
means determining that a particular video content is real and exactly the same as it was 
at the time of capture. Video authentication actually means content authentication since 
the recipient must not get a precise copy of the original video without any modification. 
For example, because of the large storing capacity, video has to be compressed, and the 
common video compression techniques (e.g., MPEG 1, 2, 4) is loss. Of course, the 
decompressed video is different from the original video. Yet, it should be still 
considered authentic. 
A video file generally consists of a container that contains video data represented 
by a video coding format and audio data represented by an audio coding format. The 
container may as well encompass synchronization data, headings and metadata (such 
as titles). Standardize video file types, such as (.webm), are configuration files that are 
specified by limiting which container format and which are the allowed formats for 
audio and video compression. The coded video and audio in the container of a video 
file are named essential elements. A program that decompresses video or audio is 
usually termed as a codec. 
A good design generally indicates that the file extension allows users to export from 
the file extension the program that can open the file. Such video file formats are 
Windows Media Video (.wmv), WebM (.webm), Ogg Video (.ogv) and Flash Video 
(.flv). Each of these formats may contain only a few videos and audio coding format 
which makes it easy to identify what codec will open the file. On the other hand, some 
common container forms (such as QuickTime (.mov) and AVI (.avi)) encompass almost 
any video and any audio format, and have a file extension name next to the type of 
container, which it makes using of the file extension by the end user very difficult to 
derive the codec or the program used to play the file [4].Video tampering may be as old 
as the video technique itself. Today, powerful software for scene editing has made it 
extremely easy to initiate a believable change of the video frame even for non-
professionals. Many of tampered media contain a part of the medium that is changed 
using objects in the same media [5]. All different types of video tampering are usually 
classified to intra-frame or inter-frame tampering. 
(a) Intra-frame tampering: Actual contents of certain frames are altered. Examples of 
these forgeries are the followings: 
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• Copy-paste forgeries: In this type, an attacker may include or eliminate an object 
to or from a video frame.  
• Upscale-crop: these forgeries require cropping a video frames to get rid of 
evidence of the video tampering, and then expanding the modified frames to 
keep the same resolution through the entire video. 
(b) Inter-frame tampering: affect in some way the sequence of frames in a video. 
Typically, these forgeries involve removing a set of frames or entering them from 
or in a video. Duplicate a frame is again a type of this counterfeit which can be 
mentioned as inter-frame copy-paste tampering. Figure 1 presents different types 
of video forgeries in this category [2]. 
Digital videos, unlike images, have no fixed specifications which mean probably there 
are different locations and sizes for video objects even for the same stream with the same 
format. For this reason, fewer methods have been developed than those developed for image 
application [1]. In This paper a new low cost video forgery detection algorithm have been 
proposed by utilizing the correlation coefficients between the adjacent video frames and 
embedding them as encrypted data into the first frame of the video stream.  The paper is 
presented as follows; next section presents the Advanced Encryption Standard Algorithm. 
Section 3 demonstrates a literature review of recent video tampering detection methods. 
Section 4 described the new proposed method, Section 5 exhibits the experimental results. 
Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 6. 
 
Fig. 1. Inter-frame video forgeries. 
2. Advanced Encryption Standard Algorithm 
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) was considered in 2001 by the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). It is a symmetric block encryption 
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algorithm replaces DES for many applications. Unlike the public-key encryption 
algorithms like RSA, the AES structure are very complex and cannot be easily 
explained like many other cipher algorithms [6, 7]. 
Encryption receipts a block size plaintext of 16 bytes or 128 bits. Length of the used 
key can be 16, 24, or 32 bytes (128, 192, or 256 bits). Depending on the key length, 
AES is named as AES-128, AES-192 or AES-256. 
The encryption process consists of N rounds, depending on the key length: 10 
rounds for a key of 16 bytes, 12 rounds for a key of 24 bytes, and consists of 14 rounds 
for a 32 bytes key. First N-1 rounds involve four different conversion functions; Sub 
Bytes, Shift Rows, Mix Columns and AddRoundKey. Three conversions only are 
contained in the last round  with one initial shift (AddRoundKey) prior to the first round. 
As inputs, each transform accepts one or more 4 × 4 matrices. A 4 × 4 matrix is 
produced as output. The function of key expansion creates N + 1 circular keys, each of 
them is a matrix of 4 × 4. AddRoundKey transform accepts each round key as one of 
its inputs in each round. General steps for the algorithm are: 
Step 1: Key Expansion: From the cipher key, round keys are derived considering 
Rijndael's key schedule.  
Step 2: Addition of first round key:  
• AddRoundKey: by means of x or, each byte of the round key is joint with 
a byte of the state. 
Step 3: 9, 11 or 13 rounds: 
• Sub Bytes: a substitution process. Using a lookup table, each byte is 
substituted with another byte.  
• Shift Rows: a transposition process. Cyclically shifting the latest three 
rows of the state a certain number of steps. 
• Mix Columns: Combining the four bytes in each column of the state.  
• AddRoundKey 
Step 4: Final round (10, 12 or 14 rounds): 
• Sub Bytes 
• Shift Rows 
• AddRoundKey 
3. Literature Review 
Existing forgery detection methods can be classified into the common way listed in Table 1. 
Digital image tampering detection utilizes active or passive detection techniques. Active 
detection approaches aim to insert a digital watermark in the images when they are taken [3]. 
Arab et al. [1] used watermarking to detect tampering [1], with respect to the video file format 
Audio/Video Interleaved (AVI). Two new spatial domain watermarking schemes have been 
proposed. The representation of each pixel was achieved by 2 bytes in the format of AVI video. 
To determine which block is changed, a block-wise technique has been used.  
Chetty et al. [3] proposed an algorithm based on the transformation of features in 
cross-modal space and the multimodal fusion of variant kinds of features. These features 
are obtained from different intra/inter-frame pixel sub-blocks in video streams to detect 
any video alteration. Proposed algorithm models allowed detecting the tamper in videos 
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with low bandwidth. This achieved by using passive tamper detection methods and 
attempting to model signatures that have been embedded in the pre-processing series in 
the camera. Two different features were evaluated, noise and quantization for copy and 
move tampering. These features demonstrate the performance of the proposed passive 
tamper detection. 
Table 1. Video tampering detection methods. 
Classification Techniques 
Active techniques Use a tracking model as a watermark which is inserted at the time of recording or when sending the video.  
Passive techniques Determine the contents legitimacy without relying on outside information. 
Intra frame techniques Considering one frame at a time at the analysis process 
Inter frame techniques Neighbouring frames relations are used to detect tampering. 
Detection techniques Detect the existence of alterations without their exact location. 
Localization techniques Locate tampering in addition to detection. 
Upadhyay and Singh [4] introduced some issues in the design of the system of 
video authentication. These issues comprise the classification of tamper attacks, 
tampering attack types and robustness. Wei et al. [5] proposed an algorithm which 
gets the visual content scales of the video frame by Gaussian pyramid transform and 
find the visual content single-scale similarity. Normalized mutual information 
between two frames has been defined using information theory. To detect the video 
tampering location, the local outlier isolated factor detection algorithm has been used. 
Yin et al. [8] used A SIFT (Scale-invariant feature transform)-based function to 
perform tamper detection in the camera. The SIFT algorithm has been improved to 
quickly generate a SIFT key point, then the SIFT-based image descriptor had been 
developed to represent images. Xiaoling and Huimin [9] have developed an algorithm 
that considers key values as the watermarking. These values were calculated using 
Hash transform to P-frame table. The watermark was embedded to motion vectors of 
P-frame. Wang et al. [10] proposed inter-frame tamper detection model when the 
Consistency of Correlation Coefficients of Gray Values (CCCoGV) has been used as 
a medical property. In original videos, CCCoGV stayed steady, intended alteration in 
the frame stream results unrealistic values. 
Xia et al. [11] detected duplicate frames. Similarities between and inside frames 
in the spatial correlations have been identified. Using average texture variation 
(ATV), a two-step blind detection algorithm for video has been proposed. Value of 
ATV is calculated for each frame to get the ATV curve of the video. Then, the 
obtained curve is further treated to highlight its property, which estimates the original 
frame rate. Qian  et al. [12] proposed an algorithm consisted of feature extraction and 
unusual point localization. In feature extraction process, the 2D phase congruency of 
each frame has been extracted. Then, using k-means clustering method, the unusual 
points were detected. 
The novelty in this work is to find with a low cost the relationship between adjacent video 
frames, encrypt the obtained values, and hide the encrypted values in the video file itself. In 
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the event of any attack on the video, the attacker cannot know the locations of the concealment 
and if it happened, he cannot decipher the code using AES algorithm because he does not 
know the key used in the encryption process. In previous studies, attacks have been mentioned 
with the possibility of their discovery. Perceptual quality and robustness values were not 
mentioned.  They did not give a detection percentage if the change was within one frame that 
could be included in the video. Various attacks that could be occurred to the video were taken 
into consideration in the proposed algorithm. Such attacks were revealed with MSE and PSNR 
calculations for each of them. 
4. Proposed Method 
A new algorithm has been proposed in this section to detect any modifications to the 




                                           Embedding                                                  Detection 
Fig. 2. Basic steps of the proposed algorithm. 
4.1. The embedding process 
The embedding process consists of three main steps (Fig. 3); calculating the correlation 
values, encrypting the resultant coefficient values using AES algorithm, and hiding the 
outcome of the encryption using bit substitution technique. The correlation coefficients 
are calculated between each two adjacent frames, starting from the second one. 
Consider a frame (f) of a video sequence of n frames. The frame correlation coefficient 
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Correlation values for adjacent frames are encrypted using AES-128 algorithm. 
Encryption receipts a block size of 128 bits or 16 bytes plaintext with 128 bits key 
length which is randomly generated. Encrypted correlation values are then embedded 
into the two least significant bits of randomly selected locations at the first frame. 
4.2. The detection process 
At the recipient side (Fig. 4), the receiver calculates the correlation values of the sent 
video, extracts the encrypted correlation values from the random location in the first 
frame, and decrypts these values using the symmetric key of the AES algorithm. Then, 
the receiver compares the obtained values. If they match, then there are no tampering, 
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Fig. 3. The embedding process. 
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Fig. 4. The detection process. 
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5. Results 
The proposed algorithm can be applied to videos with any extension. In this work, 
AVI, and .MP4 file types have been used. In order to test the performance of the 
proposed algorithm, it has been applied to five videos with a different number of 
frames and different frame sizes. Perceptual quality and robustness tests were the two 
important issues considered in results. 
5.1.  Perceptual quality test 
Mean Square Error (MSE), Peak-Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR) and Structural 
Similarity Index (SSIM) [13] have been used for measuring frame quality after the 































MSE and PSNR are calculated using Eqs. (2), and (3) respectively where the value 3 in 
summation represents color values of the image. In 24-bit images, each pixel is 
represented by three color values, namely; red, green, and blue. Therefore, each frame 
in the video is a 24-bit image. To calculate MSE and PSNR, size of the whole frame 
need to be obtained according to the following equation: 
FrameSize = row×column×3                                                                                       (4) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) = �2𝜇𝜇𝑥𝑥𝜇𝜇𝑦𝑦+𝑐𝑐1��2𝜎𝜎𝑥𝑥𝑦𝑦+𝑐𝑐2�
�𝜇𝜇𝑥𝑥2+𝜇𝜇𝑦𝑦2+𝑐𝑐1��𝜎𝜎𝑥𝑥2+𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦2+𝑐𝑐2�
                                                                (5) 
where μx, μy, σx, σy, and σxy are the local means, standard deviations, and cross-
covariance for the input video frame x, and output video frame y. SSIM values greater 
than 0.95 indicate the high perceptual quality in the objective evaluation [13]. 
Table 2 and Figs. 5 to 7 show the high quality of the resultant frame after the 
embedding process. Results also demonstrate that when frame size increased, MSE 
decreases, PSNR increases, and SSIM becomes in its maximum values. Consequently, 
metrics values depend on the frame size rather than the number of video frames. Better 
values of these metrics result from large frame sizes and small number of frames. With 
the increase of the number of video frames and the size of each frame, the execution 
time increases due to the process of calculating the value of correlation coefficients 
between each two adjacent frames. 
Table 2. Perceptual quality  
measurements values after the embedding process. 
Video no. No. of frames Frame size MSE PSNR SSIM 
Video1 133 1080*1920*3 0.0014 76.7481 1.0000 
Video2 141 240*320*3 0.0422 61.8758 0.9992 
Video3 387 202*360*3 0.1182 57.4034 0.9982 
Video4 614 1080*1920*3 0.0066 69.9378 0.9999 
Video5 747 480*640*3 0.0413 61.9713 0.9992 
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Fig. 5. Mean square error values. 
 
Fig. 6. Peak signal to noise ratio. 
 
Fig. 7. SSIM values. 
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5.2.  Robustness test 
Table 3 shows the result of applying different inter-frame and intra-frame attacks to 
video 2. Figures 8 and 9 demonstrate the comparison of metric values between the 
original and attacked video. Values of MSE and PSNR have changed after applying the 
attacks to the said video file. For example, when updating the frame in Fig. 10 by adding 
some dots, values of MSE are slightly increased. Consequently, PSNR decreased. In 
this figure we notice that in spite of adding only two dots to the frame and it looks close 
to the original frame, values of MSE and PSNR has been changed, which means even 
small changes can be detected. When duplicating two specific frames, error rate became 
more than its value before this attack, but less than its value when adding the dots 
because the added frames are from the same video stream. As for deleting one particular 
frame, MSE increased due to changing the correlation coefficient values. 
When modifying a part of the frame (changing the colour of one column of the piano 
in Fig. 11), MSE has also become high compared to its value in other attacks. The 
highest MSE were obtained when exchanging two frames (Fig. 12) because changes in 
four correlation value of frames have been occurred. Note that an attack with a small 
change in a frame leads to a change in the value of MSE (even it is small) and this is 
enough to detect tampering. 
Table 3. Robustness values after applying attacks on video 2. 
Attacks MSE PSNR 
Modifying frame (Intra-frame attack) 0.0649 60.0057 
Duplicating two frames (Inter-frame attack) 0.0672 59.8551 
Deleting a frame (Inter-frame attack) 0.0665 59.9030 
Exchanging frames (Intra-frame attack) 0.0671 59.8613 
Modifying a part of a frame (Intra-frame attack) 0.0655 59.9661 
 
Fig. 8. Comparison of MSE values on original and attacked videos. 
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Fig. 9. Comparison of PSNR values on original and attacked videos. 
  
(a) Original frame. (b) Modified frame. 
Fig. 10. Modifying a frame by inserting some dots. 
  
(a) Original frame. (b) Modified frame. 
Fig. 11. Modifying a part of a frame. 
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(a) Original frame. (b) Modified frame. 
Fig. 12. Exchanging frames. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, a new video tampering detection algorithm has been proposed by finding 
the correlation coefficients between each two adjacent frames and embedding them into 
a randomly selected locations of the first frame. For security enhancement, the 
correlation coefficients were encrypted using AES algorithm before the embedding 
process. Experimental results show high detection capabilities even after applying 
different inter-frame and intra-frame attacks while keeping high visual frame quality. 
On-going research is to detect the exact tamper location, within the frame or within the 
whole video stream. 
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